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DISCUSSION - SESSION THREE
The comments made by the speakers are their own personal remarks and
do not necessarily represent the official view of any organization or agency
they represent.
CHAIRMAN BRIG. GEN. MARTIN MENTER: If I may open the floor to
discussions or questions. Captain Herman from the Air Force Academy, Law De-
partment.
CAPT. ALAN I. HERMAN: It seems to me that this session has been a cul-
mination, almost, of all the talk that went on yesterday. However, I have two or
three questions which I'll direct at large to the members.
First of all I think that the matter has to be viewed, in some respect, from the
plaintiff's lawyer's view point. Where there is any possibility of a . . .two level
system of liability, it is his obligation to his client to seek the higher level. There's
no question about that. If the claimants' remedy against the carrier is $75,000 or
$100,000, no matter what it may be, and there is any possibility of going beyond
that figure, he's going to try for it and it's his obligation to try for it. Now this
may be against Air Traffic Control, against other carriers, against the manu-
facturer or against the component manufacturer. I would like to see some com-
ment from a member of the panel on the feasibility of an exclusive remedy for
passengers; the exclusive remedy of the passenger being solely against his carrier.
And in order to maintain some degree of fairness to the carrier for nonfault or
non-negligent claims made against him, a possibility of an action over, up to
only the limited amount of $75,000 or $100,000, against any one of the other
participants, such as the component manufacturer, the manufacturer of the air-
craft, ATC, or another aircraft. Now, has this been considered by the Legal Com-
mittee or by the Panel of Experts?
DR. PIETER SWART: You take it for granted that the attorney will seek
the higher limit. That's logical. It is his duty to try to get everything for his
client which he is able to get. I do not understand, however, why the passenger
should be able to also make a claim against somebody other than the carrier,
such as the manufacturer of the aircraft or the A.T.C. If the carrier is absolutely
liable it will pay, provided it is able to do so, and in most cases it will be if
compulsory insurance can be introduced, but as far as I know that is not con-
sidered very urgent. I do not see why a passenger should have the possibility to
claim from other persons who may have caused the accident by their negligence,
such as the A.T.C., the manufacturer of the aircraft, the maintenance shop, or
other persons such as a passenger or the caterer. In my view it is quite a satis-
factory system to concentrate the liability on the operator.
Now the probelm, if and to what extent the carrier should have recourse against
the other persons who have been negligent. The idea of the Panel was to leave the
carrier this possibility. It would have to be provided by the applicable national
law. Probably national laws contain provisions to that effect. The same problem
arises under the Rome Convention. The idea of the Panel was that national laws
would necessarily create such provisions. The Panel expected that the passengers
as a rule would sue the carrier, since that would be easier for them. They would
however keep the possibility to sue others such as the A.T.C. or the manufacturer
of the aircraft directly, but they would only do so in the relatively rare cases
that they could prove fault on the part of these parties.
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CAPT. HERMAN: I'm recalling the observation that Lee Kreindler made yes-
terday, that you couldn't preclude the individual seeking recovery from going
against the manufacturer on separate litigation.
MR. ALLAN MENDELSOHN: I thought that was a suggesting statement
by Mr. Kreindler. I have the feeling that you probably can, by treaty, preclude
suits against anyone other than the carrier himself. The United States hasn't been
prepared to do this and indeed hasn't wished to do it.
CAPT. HERMAN: Well, I would think that Mr. Kreindler is referring to the
existing state of the law rather than what could be done under a treaty. Any
observation on that?
MR. LEE KREINDLER: I would be interested to know if there is anybody in
the room who thinks there is a possibility of the United States entering a conven-
tion which denies American citizens the opportunity to sue almost anybody.
I would like to very briefly answer a question put by Dr. Swart. You asked,
"why does the United States require such high limits when Canada, which also
has a high standard of living, is satisfied with much smaller limits?" The answer
is quite simply a remarkable difference in awards as between the United States
and Canada. In American airline cases plaintiffs customarily, recover hundreds of
thousands of dollars and recoveries in Canada are less than $50,000. Now, I don't
know why this is, but I suggest that that's the answer to your question.
I would like to ask you this question, Dr. Swart. You pointed out, quite graphi-
cally, and I was very interested to hear you say, that there are other bases for
recovery and the satisfaction of the need to take care of the victims of these ac-
cidents in your country. You pointed to the highly developed social security sys-
tem, for example. Isn't this the best indication of the doubtful goal of uniformity
in international air laws as far as damages are concerned? Doesn't this fact, that
there are possibilities in your country that do not exist in the United States,
doesn't this show very graphically the false premise of invoking a standard limi-
tation with standard standards world-wide? Doesn't this show that's what's good
in your country is not necessarily good in other countries?
DR. SWART: I agree with you that it is not easy to reach unification in this
field. That is clear from the fact that the Convention left several items to the
applicable national law, which has had the result that the differences have become
even bigger than they were at first. Concerning the differences between the
United States and the Netherlands: I agree that there is some difference, but it is
not as big as it seems, because the pensions and the social security system men-
tioned by me also exist, be it to a lesser extent, in the United States. However,
there one does ignore them under the present system. I am convinced that the
differences will become smaller in the future. That difference should not be used
as an argument against the existing unification of the law.
MR. EUGENE JERICHO: I wanted to touch on something that I don't think
has been really mentioned here, and may be beyond the scope of this conference,
but I'd like to direct an inquiry to you, Mr. Mendelsohn, if I may on this propo-
sition. Since the State Department has undertaken the commendable goal of look-
ing after United States citizens and in this particular conference being in the
realm of continuing absolute liability in international air traffic and pushing for
a continued increase in limits, I'm wondering, Mr. Mendelsohn, if the State De-
partment envisions their efforts, if successful here, in extending that philosophy to
perhaps domestic air transportation, then on to other forms of transportation.
* . I would in all sincerity wonder what the State Department envisions as to
the extension of this philosophy beyond the immediate concern of this Sym-
posium.
MR. MENDELSOHN: I think you're asking for the social philosophy of the
United States government and not necessarily the Department of State. What
State legislatures will in the future do in this area is something that I frankly
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don't know. I think they're on their way at this point to eliminating the limita-
tion laws in the various States. They may go forward. You may get unification
of laws simply by a Restatement or by way of uniform tort law, but I've taken
no part in this at all and I really can't predict.
MR. GERARD DES ILES: I wonder if Mr. Mendelsohn would be good enough
to explain for my benefit his concept of domicile in the proposed amendment.
I'm not too sure we're talking about the same thing ...
MR. MENDELSOHN: Mr. des Iles, I think that's a very interesting question.
I think in ninety-five percent of the cases you can tell where a man is domiciled.
I think by international law and by domestic law there is a test for domicile where
his estate will be probated, where he has most of his contacts, things of that na-
ture. I agree and I am frank to admit that there is a five percent factor, perhaps
it's five percent. Mr. Milligan raised one problem to me of a TWA representative
who's been living in Europe for twenty years. Mr. Onek raised a further example
of a TWA representative living in Europe for twenty years and married to a
French girl with three children in France. I think those are cases which the courts
would have to resolve and I think we can give a certain amount of leeway
to the courts in being able to resolve this five percent. But it was my thought
that the mere fact that we have a small difficulty, what I consider to be a rela-
tively minor problem in this, shouldn't mean, as was so often said in Montreal
during the conference, that we should throw out the baby with the bath water.
MR. DES ILES: It's important for my point of view if the law of domicile is
going to control the liability, the amount of money you recover. I would be very
happy to know that the Trinidad law would be what the judge would be apply-
ing. I consider it very important that the judge understood that the man was
domiciled in Trinidad as opposed to being permanently a resident. Would the
element of having no immediate intention of going away therefrom be incor-
porated in your idea of domicile?
MR. MENDELSOHN: I think that would be one of the elements. I think
there's another element that is where the widow and children are likely to stay. I
think the problem of domicile might even be more difficult in a domestic United
States context than it would be in international context.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: Mr. Brennan.
MR. P. J. BRENNAN: Mr. Chairman, there's just a couple of comments I'd
like to make. The first point I'd like to go back to in this whole debate is really
not so much a legal problem; it's a problem of public relations, policy, tactics,
anything else you'd like to call it, and that is the point that Mr. Kreindler made
about the attitude of the Senate, the hard line that the Senate has taken and he
predicted would continue to take. And I think we have to face up to this because
it is a fact. And it's a fact which, in all due respect to the Senate, undoubted-
ly been influenced by the fact, in turn, that a member of their own cloth
was involved in this controversy. I don't know if they'd have taken the same
view if it had been otherwise. It's a very natural reaction, but it's one we have
to bear in mind and I think we ignore it at our peril. The Trial Lawyer's Asso-
ciation obviously has done something about its side of the case and more power
to it. And therefore, I think it's up to other interests involved who are also con-
cerned with the public interest to do something in this direction.
In relation to the question in general of the tort liability system, of what is
called the free tort liability system, we have to recognize that there was an effort
by the airlines to establish a free contract system of liability, but this, by statute,
judgments and otherwise has in general tended to be overruled. So that it just
isn't possible to get either an idea of a statutory and conventional situation that
would take care of all our problems just as the free, so called free, tort liability
system doesn't solve all our problems.
Now, I think I should comment on the point Mr. Mendelsohn made that in-
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surance costs pose no problem. Well, of course they pose no problem for the State
Department because they don't have to pay them, but they do pose problems for
some of our airlines, and this is just one of those facts, fortuitous or otherwise,
that we have to take account of. And in passing may I just warn everybody con-
cerned that another fortuitous factor slipped into Mr. Mendelsohns' paper, as
he gets the figure of $150,000 in, e.g. Just let's be careful about that tendency.
Now, the compulsory insurance, which is referred to, is predicated on the avail-
ability of that insurance. And when we consider the larger aircraft which are
coming and the relationships of accidents to landings and takeoffs, I think you
can see where you're moving into in the question of coverage and coverage against
enormous indemnities.
As a final point I'd like to suggest that if we are referring to this interim
agreement and we want to try to extend it, and it may seem a small point but
an important psychological point, I would like to suggest that we don't call it
the CAB Agreement or the Washington Agreement; let's call it the Montreal
Agreement. I'm sure my American friends will get the message on that one and
they will agree with us indeed if they are interested, as they should be, in ex-
tending that type of system. And I have envisioned that we should modify it in
some way, improve the agreement, then extend it.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: Col. Jaffe.
COL. MORTON S. JAFFE: Thank you. I just wanted to say that I think in
respect to Mr. Mendelsohn's proposal that we adopt the domicile principle that
we've probably been overtaken by events. Even our courts are getting away from
it now, getting more into this center of gravity theory in conflict situations; in
other words where are all of the contacts, the most numerous contacts, and to
talk about domicile in this context I think is maybe a little old fashioned. I think
we ought to keep up with the trend of the law, not only in this country but
transnational law in other areas that Professor Sand can talk about more appro-
priately than I can. That was the only point I wanted to make.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: Professor Sand.
PROF. PETER SAND: I must say, I'm rather frightened by the can of worms
that is going to open up on the question of domicile which certainly will cause quite
a lot of new sessions in the ICAO Panel of Experts. And I just want to point out
one thing. Does this proposal for establishing the passenger's domicile as a possible
jurisdiction and a possible governing law, or maybe the governing law for the
awarding of damages, does this include passengers residing in non-Warsaw coun-
tries? It would logically have to, which would mean that a passenger who resides
in Turkey and takes a Warsaw flight would then have to be judged by the standards
of Turkey, which is not a member of the Warsaw Convention. You would have
to assume, then, for the award of damages, that you will have to construe a new
law of Turkey: apply the law of Turkey as if she had ratified the Warsaw Con-
vention or if she were a member of the Interim Agreement. I do believe that this
will really pose tremendous problems in establishing the law that will govern the
awarding of damages.
MR. MENDELSOHN: In answer to the Colonel's question, it was my point of
view in the remarks that I made that we are really applying, under Kilberg,
Pearson, Long and all the rest of those cases, a domicile theory of law though we
call it center of gravity, contacts, or predominance of contacts. It is indeed no
more than the selection of the passenger's domicile or permanent place of resi-
dence. So the purpose of most of my proposal is simply to recognize reality and
apply the law of the domicile both in the context of the Warsaw Convention as
well as in a domestic context.
Now, this brings me to Professor Sand's question and I don't think that would
really raise a problem. Let's say the victim is on a Warsaw flight and let's say
that the limit is, much to the shock of Mr. Brennan, $150,000, because I don't
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think the limit is very important when the law of the domicile controls. I don't
think that these figures are out of the picture by any means. Now let's say the
limit is $100,000 or $150,000. If the Turk brought his suit in a United States
court, and whether or not it was controlled by the Convention, whether or not
it was a Convention flight, the United States court would apply the law of
Turkey and would award that Turk damages just as though he were suing in a
court in Turkey. And that's the proposal.
(A hypothetical illustration concerning domiciliary problems was posed.)
MR. MENDELSOHN: I appreciate your question very much. I think that this
is what we are always up against in the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion. The easiest way to kill a proposal is by figuring out the most obtuse hypo-
thetical, and posing that as the means to defeat the proposal. Now, I agree
with you; there will be perhaps five percent of the cases, including the tax dodger
who's established a residence in Geneva, but that's a very, very small percentage
of the cases. I think in that case, however, his citizenship would be one factor;
the reasons why he moved to Switzerland would be another factor; the perma-
nence of his residence in Switzerland might be a third factor; where his estate
will be probated will be a fourth factor; where the dependents will reside is a fifth
factor; and all of these factors go together in permitting a court, and I think
we should give a court some discretion in these five percent of the cases, to de-
termine precisely what his domicile is.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: Let me ask if Dr. Swart has a comment.
DR. SWART: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say a few words in con-
nection with the suggestion made by Mr. Mendelsohn. The Panel discussed similar
proposals, one based on nationality as a criterion, and one based on residence or
domicile. You will find a reference to it somewhere in the report. I agree with
Mr. Mendelsohn that the criterion of domicile is more satisfactory than the cri-
terion of nationality and that it is also more satisfactory than the criterion of
origin and destination. Both proposals, the one based on residence and the one
based on nationality, were rejected by the Panel for three main reasons. In the
first place, the reason already mentioned by Mr. Mendelsohn, that in a certain
number of cases the residence of a passenger is very difficult to ascertain. This is
a serious difficulty even if the case arises in only 5 percent of the cases, this being
the estimate of Mr. Mendelsohn. The second reason is that it would add a new
criterion to the Convention which already has a different criterion for the de-
termination of its scope. By adding a new criterion one would create a very
complicated system. The third and most important reason is that it would result
in discrimination between passengers paying the same fare, since they would re-
cover differently according to their residence. I believe these were the main reasons.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: Now I call on Sir William Hildred.
SIR WILLIAM HILDRED: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mendelsohn's reference to the
word domicile causes me more concern than his casual references, e.g., to
$150,000. But I'm probably the only man in this room, indeed I hope I am, who
has suffered the agonies of double residence. . . . The agony of double residence,
the confusion about residence, is a dreadful thing and if you keep this session
going, you will come up with one little quirkish question after another and
you will never settle it. Residence, ordinary residence, you can be resident and or-
dinarily resident; you can be resident and not ordinarily resident. You can be
asked what is your domicile of origin; then you can be asked what is your domi-
cile of intent. And, when questioned about 1960-Where do I live?-I just
couldn't answer it. If there is anything likely to create more confusion-agony--
misery-lawyer's bonanza's-it is this matter of domicile. I couldn't keep quiet
when that word was uttered .... Next I have Mr. McKenry of the University of
Miami.
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CHAIRMAN MENTER: Next I have Prof. McKenry of the University of
Miami.
PROF. CARL McKENRY: In keeping with Mr. Brennan, our Irish colleague,
I have a comment or two according to Mr. Mendelsohn's definition. The first one
is in regard to a comment that was made today that was also made by Professor
Sand yesterday. That is in regard to the elimination of the claimant's attorney
at the first plateau. . . . It brings to mind the quotation from Shakespeare, the
first thing we do is kill all the lawyers, in the sense that I don't see how we can
expect the claimant not to get counsel, even on this first level, because relying
on the generosity of the insurance carrier I think is asking too much of the in-
surance carrier who has stockholders, directors and other problems and pressures.
And at the same time, who will make determinations, such as shall we try for the
second plateau; who will evaluate the medical evidence; who will determine on
behalf of the claimant (who is going to look to someone to advise him) what
amount would be proper and appropriate?
As an alternative to this approach I would suggest, number one, that the
claimants' bar, through their own enlightened self-interest, in those cases where
the recovery is below the first plateau, where we're talking about absolute liabil-
ity, keep their fees commensurate, when we're talking about a lower recovery.
Now, the suggestion of enlightened self-interest would be a sword of Damocles
of putting in the Convention, if needed, a provision that the attorney's fees would
be set by the court. I think that, while that alternative might not be acceptable,
certainly the idea that the claimant can rely on the insurance carrier at the first
plateau is neither realistic, nor fair to the plaintiff.
Secondly, the question of statistics has emerged. I would characterize that since
noon yesterday we have had a battle of statistics. Mr. Kreindler mentioned it;
Mr. Stephen mentioned it; and we started talking about statistics this morning.
And without asking for a reply, I noticed that on the schedule this afternoon we
have two Titans of the insurance industry in this particular area and it would
seem to me this afternoon one appropriate thing that might be done is try and
seek a way of getting acceptable statistics. It's rather frightening that we're
talking about three different sets of statistics. One point Mr. Kreindler made was
that the statistics from his office indicated a substantially higher award than a
roughly $38,000. I'm sure Mr. Stephen will comment on this later. But on the
other hand, one of the attorneys in Mr. Martin's office was telling me of a case
where the passenger had received some sort of a superficial cut and it left a scar
on her leg and he settled that case in the office, I think he said, for about a $1,000.
Now, I don't know whether that case is in the statistics or not. It was a Warsaw
case. So my second comment is that perhaps an ad hoc statistics committee of
some sort could grow out of this symposium.
The third one is that in regard to the change in Article 28, I concur with Pro-
fessor Sand. I think this is a real can of worms we may be opening because
Article 28 has pretty well been hammered down in terms of the state versus
federal jurisdictional question in the United States. It's been fairly well cleared
up as to the third contact which is the principle place of business of the carrier.
To open this up, for what I believe is maybe less than five percent, might cause
a great deal of mischief.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: I have on my list several more . . . Mr. Winser.
MR. C. ANTHONY WINSER: Well, I have a question for Mr. Mendelsohn
primarily on his e.g. My interest, I might add, does lie in the field of aviation in-
surance. I've been listening for three days to everybody discuss $75,000 or
$100,000. This morning we broke the barrier and went up to $150,000. A point
that I have is, and I don't know if it's ever been surveyed or not, I'm quite curi-
ous, has anybody in the Government or any independent body ever made any
kind of study of what we can expect in the way of a total insurance capacity
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with the advent of the Boeing-Hilton, otherwise known as the 747, which is just
around the corner? The insurance world is not a bottomless market. We've been
tossing the figure around of a 70 million dollar claim. I think that's reasonable;
it's quite possible. And we could have a midair collision of 140 million dollars.
Now, there are a lot of people in aviation insurance and this capacity for 70 mil-
lion exists today. But I think it would only exist perhaps once, certainly not more
than twice, because many people in the aviation insurance business at the moment
are not the hard core of the aviation insurance world; there are people being
brought in and they can easily go out again. They came in to make money; if
they don't make money, they'll duck out. In addition to what we have in aviation
you could easily have some of the national disasters we've had this year like the
McCormack fire, Pepsi a few years ago, riots, and so forth. All these things are
going to affect your aviation insurance market. My question to you, and perhaps
a suggestion, why not conduct an objective survey and develop what your ca-
pacity is and then take it and spread it back down? This would determine how
much you want to pay a passenger rather than starting at how much you should
pay him? You might be very much surprised, Mr. Mendelsohn, to find that there
isn't anything like the capacity you think there is to pay the insurance claims of
the world's airlines. I don't know. I'm saying someone should find out.
MR. MENDELSOHN: I think that's an extremely interesting approach and
I think that we could well begin to study that. Let me say only one word about
this. We might be able to do this in conjunction with the United States air car-
riers because, after all, and I take this from our distinguished friend Mr. Harold
Caplan, and I owe him a debt of gratitude for this thought, the American carriers
are facing this same problem with 747's operating in the United States without
limits, totally without limits. And as Mr. Caplan points out, it has involved no
increase in fares. Indeed, our fares in the United States are significantly lower than
the per milage fares in Europe. So I have great faith in the ability of the insurance
carriers to handle this and to carry this. I really have sufficient confidence in the
world insurers to know that even though it may mean a rise in insurance costs
you will be able to come through, and you will especially be able to come through
with a limitation.
May I say one last word to Sir William Hildred . . . I would like to ask him
one question. When, in his two million miles of travel, he had a permanent resi-
dence as the distinguished Director-General of IATA and a permanent residence
in England, where did he consider himself domiciled?
SIR WILLIAM HILDRED: Yes sir. There's no doubt of twenty years domi-
ciled in Peel Street, Montreal, but the Inland Revenue said none of it; you're
living in England.
MR. HAROLD CAPLAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful to my friend, Mr. Tony
Winser, for suggesting that the problem of capacity be examined. I can only
assure those present that the problem of capacity on a world-wide basis is at the
present moment the subject of a serious international study by Aviation In-
surers .... I can assure you that if we get the premiums and if there are reason-
able limits of liability in international aviation, there's no problem about capacity
that we can see. Those are the two problems.
MR. LEIGH RATINER: I'm very disappointed to hear the remarks of people
in this room which I would catagorize unqualifiededly as bureaucratic in the
worst sense with respect to opening a can of worms. I wish I could never hear
that word again. I hear it a dozen times every single day. There has been no
analysis of Mr. Mendelsohn's proposal. Sir William's remarks were amusing, it's
true, but I think domicile could be defined in the Warsaw Convention. And if
it can't be defined, we in the Government and you lawyers in the industry, and
the law firms aren't worth the money we're paid. Now, I would like to hear
from the low level proponents, that Mr. Mendelsohn mentioned, exactly why
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his theory wouldn't work. And I'd like it to be analytical rather than humorous.
CHAIRMAN MENTER: I think we've run out of time gentlemen ...
I have a responsibility as moderator to summarize. As I saw it Dr. Swart gave
us the presentation on why the United States's proposal wasn't a good one,
the effect as he saw it, and as he saw other countries view it. Allan Mendelsohn
gave us a rather refreshing or novel, interesting proposal. I would like to sum-
marize this proposal; it has one top limit of liability, which won't be broken for
wilfulness, probably a test of absolute liability, which he said was negotiable,
with the law of the domicile of the passenger to decide his case, wherever that
case was heard. And, lastly, Professor Larsen gave us his comments on the con-
solidation proposal of the Rome Convention, the Aerial Collisions Convention,
perhaps bringing in the Warsaw Convention; all of these where liability grows
out of a single aviation mishap being considered in one convention and how
that applied to the interim proposal.
End of Friday morning discussion.
